This paper considers the bidirectional interaction between states and communication network in a multi-robot system. It proposes two alternative games that are extremes of each other for network formation. In pairwise games, each robot decides to establish or break off a link based on the improvement this offers to it individually. In turn, its state evolves based on state information received from its immediate neighbors only. In coalition games, all the robots in each coalition decide collectively and new links are added or removed based on the improvement they offer to the respective coalition. This time, the state of each robot evolves based on state information from all the other robots in its coalition, albeit with delays that depend on their geodesic proximity. Simulation results provide insights on comparative performance with respect to task completion and connectivity under varying move periods.
INTRODUCTION
Many applications involving multi-robot systems require the integration of control and communication. As the robots move around, there is a complex interaction between the robots' states and network topology bidirectionally. Each as well as their bidirectional interaction need to be effectively modeled in order to have robust and efficient robot systems. Three research areas are related: multirobot systems, communication networks and game theory. Most multi-robot systems have an underlying hybrid nature -a continuous aspect pertaining to the robots' states and a discrete nature that is defined by their interaction. The models proposed for hybrid systems depend to a great extent on the type of system requirements [17, 23] . The relation between control and graph networks has been studied from different aspects [10, 13, 16] . However, in cases where the robots' states and the associated network evolve in disparate, but coupled manners, strategies pertaining to network evolution need to be considered [21] . While most approaches assume complete communication and hence fully connected networks [18] , as this may not be always possible, it is more realistic to consider robot systems having restricted communication [15] . A model of robotic network that incorporates control and communication law, coordination task, and time and communication complexity is presented in [7] . The modeling of networks of autonomous agents has been addressed within game theory -where network formation is based on pairwise games [4] or coalition structures [1, 14] . However, these models do not take the dynamics of the players into account. Hence, the interplay between dynamics and the evolving robot network remains relatively less studied. We have addressed this problem within multi-robot navigation and have proposed three alternative strategies for evolving the communication network that vary from being of deterministic, game-theoretic and hybrid nature [5] .
In this paper, we study the problem of communication network formation in a general multi-robot system where the agents are dynamic. The network topology changes in response to the robots' states while in turn the states are affected by the network topology. We assume that each robot has the ability to communicate directly with its immediate neighbors in this network. The contribution of this paper is to propose two alternative games for network formation that are extremes of each other and compare their performance. In the first approach, the evolution of the network is determined by pairwise games where in each move, each robot considers only its individual payoff in activating or removing links with the rest of the robots. The alternative approach has a completely different nature where the communication network is determined via having all the robots that are in the same coalition play a game collectively. The preliminaries of multi-robot systems are defined in Section 2. Pairwise and coalition games are formulated in Section 3 and Section 4 respectively. The application of these two alternative approaches to the multirobot navigation problem is presented in Section 5. The paper concludes with a brief summary including future work.
MULTI-ROBOT SYSTEM
A multi-robot system consists of two entities: A set P = {1, . . . , p} of robots along with their dynamics and the communication network. Each robot i ∈ P has radius ρ i ∈ R and is associated with a state b i ∈ R 2 . For each pair ij of robots, let δ ij = b i − b j denote the robots' pairwise distance. The state of the robots b(t) ∈ R 2p at time t is defined as b = i∈P b i ⊗ e i where e i ∈ R p are the unit vectors in R p . As robots cannot overlap, it is required that δ ij should be greater than the sum of their radii ρ ij = ρ i + ρ j -namely ∀ij, δ ij ≥ ρ ij . If the workspace is bounded by radius ρ 0 , then each robot should stay in workspace -namely ∀i ∈ P , b i ≤ ρ 0i with ρ 0i = ρ 0 − ρ i . The free robot configuration space F ⊂ R 2p satisfies non-overlapping and boundary conditions. The robots' dynamics are dependent on the information available to them which in turn depends on the game played for the communication network formation as explained in Sections 3-4.
Communication Network
The communication network that exists among the robots specifies which robots are able to communicate directly. It is defined by a state-dependent graph map g : F → G where G = g ′ |g ′ ⊆ g P is the set of all possible graphs on P and g p is the complete graph. The graph map is defined as g(b) = (P, E(b)) where E(b) denotes the set of edges as defined by a communication matrix
. If a ij = 1, this means that robot i wants to communicate with robot j. Note that A(b) is not necessarily symmetric. If both robots want to communicate (as indicated by both a ij = a ji = 1), the corresponding edge ij is added to E(b). Hence, E(b) represents the robot pairs i and j between which a communication link is establishednamely E(b) = {ij | a ij = a ji = 1}. Direct communication is possible only between robot pairs i and j having direct link -namey ij ∈ E(b). In the sequel, for ease of notation, g(b) is denoted as g whenever the relation is clear.
Each graph g defines for each robot i ∈ P the set of nhop neighbors N n i (g) ⊆ P -namely the indices of robots that can be reached via traversing the communication network after n hops. Of particular importance are the immediate neighbors -namely 1-hop neighbors defined as
be the complement set, the set N n i (g) can be recursively defined as:
Thus, each (n) th neighbor of robot i has a link with at least one of (n − 1) th neighbors, but it does not have a link with one of (n − 2) nd neighbors. When N n i (g) = ∅, the process is stopped. The 1-hop neighborhoods N 1 i (g) correspond to the edges of graph g. In contrast, N n i (g) denotes the robots it is indirectly connected after nhops. Given a graph g, if n i denotes the maximum hop number for each robot i, N n i (g) = ∅ for all n > n i . Getting information from n-hop neighbors is possible only if robots propagate the information they receive from their immediate neighbors. Of course, the received information regarding non-immediate neighbors is outdated with an amount that depends their respective geodesic distancenamely the number of hops in the shortest path between itself and the other robot.
Game-Theoretic Network
In game-theoretic communication network formation, the communication network g is defined by the type of the game played among the robots. First, it is assumed that each robot has a fixed amount of transmitter power P T allocated for communication. As it can communicate directly only with its immediate neighbors, under a particular collective state b and network g, each robot has the policy of trying to allocate its transmission power uniformly only among its directly linked
As the network is changing over time, this means that power allocation per communication link is also dynamic. Furthermore, a scheduling mechanism like TDMA or FDMA is assumed to be used in order to ensure that there is no interference caused by simultaneous communication of different robots in the network. Secondly, all the games are based on the trade-off between attaining high SNR and power usage efficiency assuming an environmental noise with variance σ 2 n . Finally, the robots continue to play the game with moves all having period of T g seconds. The robots stop playing either when they accomplish their task or have reached the maximum allowable play time. The game type determines not only how the communication network is formed, but also the extent of the neighborhood used in defining each robot's dynamics. The game type is related to the extent of each robot's neighborhood which in turn influences both its dynamics and decision making with respect to the communication network. Two alternative games are proposed: pairwise and coalition games.
PAIRWISE GAMES
In pairwise games, each robot affects the network via possibly playing a pairwise game with another randomly selected teammate. Hence, the decisions that are made are purely from egocentric perspective. As the approach does not require any detectors for the received signal levels, it is very easy to implement on a real multi-robot system.
Individual Robot Payoff
Each robot is associated with a payoff function that considers only its direct communication with its immediate neighbors:
The pairwise payoff function v ij : G × F → R is defined as:
The first term encodes the degree of satisfaction of the pair ij with the link quality. As the quality of link is known to depend on SNR, it can be measured by an increasing function of SNR with the additional to property that its value must be equal to 0 in case SN R = 0. This means that a robot is more and more satisfied with the service as the quality improves. We use a sigmoid function for this purpose [22] although other functions of similar nature may also be utilized. Here, τ is the lower bound for SNR to maintain a reliable connection, l(δ ij ) = 1/δ denotes the loss factor due to diffusion and absorption in the environment and N o = 2σ 2 n denotes the noise spectral density and the parameters ς i and a i affect the shape of the sigmoid function and hence denote the maximum gain and the gain when SNR is in the neighborhood of τ . The second term measures the cost incurred for having this link. The cost is defined as a function of power and distance. As power is itself a valuable commodity, the specific cost function should reflect the expense of establishing a link with a particular robot. In particular, as their pairwise distance gets larger, so does the cost of this communication link.
Pairwise Game Rules & Network Update
In pairwise games, each individual robot plays a pairwise game with the rest of the robots. Let p ij be the probability that it chooses to play with robot j. Consequently, it is associated with a set of decisions
) where x i,j (t) ∈ {0, 1} as:
1 with probability p ij 0 with probability 1 − p ij
If x i,j (t) = 1, robot i wants to play a game with j. In case a robot wants to play with more than one robot, it chooses one player j with uniform probability. This dynamic process requires no communication or synchronization for selecting the robot pairs. Once this decision is made, the pair ij is selected to play a pairwise game. Note that the order is not important -the pair ij being selected is equivalent to the pair ji being selected. Let S(t) be the set of robot pairs that are selected.
In the game-theoretic network formation, the graph g is updated based on a game-theoretic approach. Given that ij ∈ S play the game, if the edge ij is already in the robot network, the decision is to deactivate it or not while otherwise, the decision is to activate it or not -all based on the payoff function. Robots act individually and decide to activate a link if it makes each robot at least as well off and one better off and remove a link if its deletion makes either robot better off. Let g+ij denote the graph obtained by adding the edge ij to the existing graph g and g − ij denote the graph obtained by removing the link ij from g. The pair ij then updates the communication matrix A(b(t)) as follows:
Hence, the communication matrix changes depending on the pairwise games that are being played, while all matrix entries where there are no corresponding games being played remain unchanged.
In a pairwise game, when two directly linked robots are communicating with each other, they exchange only their individual information regarding state and goal. Hence, each robot gains access to information only from its immediate neighbors N 1 i (g). Assuming a first order system wlog and a control law u i,1 that depends on its state as well as those of its 1-hop neighbors as designated by the network graph g and b, the robots' states evolve as:
∀i ∈ Pḃ i = u i,1 (b, g) (8) Assuming that the communication delay between immediate neighbors is small and hence can be ignored, the control laws and hence dynamics incorporate limited, yet up-to-date state information.
COALITION GAMES
In coalitions, the goal is to attain a coalition structure that maximizes the total payoff of each coalition. Hence in contrast to pairwise games where each robot acts individually, in coalition games, the robots in a coalition act collectively. Once coalitions are formed, during the course of the task, each coalition takes an action depending on whether removing an existing link (that may possibly lead to breaking up of the coalition) or adding a new link (that may also lead to the merging of coalitions) improves the total payoff of the coalition.
Coalition Formation
The coalitions can be determined via a partitioning process of the robot index set P . Let the cells of this partition be denoted by C 1 (g), . .., C s(g) (g) where 1 ≤ s(g) ≤ p where C c (g) ∈ 2 P and s(g) is the number of cells in this partition. Note that C c (g) ⊆ P such that 1 ≤ |C c (g)| ≤ p and ∪ s(g) c=1 C c (g) = P . LetC c (g) △ = P − C c (g) denote the complement sets. The partition index set is given by S(g) △ = {i ∈ P |i ≤ s(g) }. A partition C c (g) of P is defined by the recursive definition whose base step is given by
and whose recursive step is given by
The process is stopped when j≤n−1C j (g) = ∅. Define the number of cells as:
At each configuration this partition divides up the robots into s(g) coalitions as denoted by c∈S(g) C c (g).
Coalition Payoff
A coalition payoff function is constructed for each coalition C c based on the payoff functions of all the robots in the coalition as:
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Here, each coalition acts as one and the goal is to maximize the total payoff defined as such by adjusting the communication network.
Coalition Game Rules & Network Update
In coalition games, the members of each coalition C c act collectively. First, each member bids another robot with pairwise game rules. The coalition collects all the bids from all of its members into S c (t). Note that at least one robot of the robot pairs ij ∈ S c (t) must be in the coalition C cnamely i ∈ C c or j ∈ C c . Next, the coalition decides on the goodness of each bid one by one using w c depending on the nature of each ij ∈ S c (t). In coalition games, in contrast to pairwise games, the decision making takes relatively much longer than that in pairwise games, as the coalition evaluates each bid sequentially.
Consider coalition C c and ij ∈ S c (t). Furthermore suppose that i ∈ C c wlog. Two alternative decisions are possible depending on whether the other robot j is in the coalition C c or not. In case j ∈ C c , then again two decisions are possible depending on whether or not there is an edge between robots i and j. If ij ∈ E(b), then the decision is to remove it or not while conversely, the decision is to add it or not. In case j / ∈ C c , then the decision is to add it to the coalition or not. Since this situation implies that j ∈ C d where c = d, the decision making incorporates both of the coalitions payoff functions w c and w d respectively. Note that this decision may amount to merging of the two coalitions unless robot j is simultaneously kicked out from the other coalition. The communication matrix A(b(t)) is updated as follows:
Hence, the communication matrix changes depending on the coalition games that are being played. All entries where there are no games being played remain unchanged.
In a coalition game, when two directly linked robots are communicating, they exchange not only each others' state and goal information, but also propagate to each other the information they received from their other immediate neighbors. Hence each robot gains access to the information of other robots in the coalition, albeit with propagation delays that are dependent on their geodesic distance. If d c is the diameter of the coalition C c it is in and δt d is the propagation delay per one hop, then the received state information can be with d c δt d delay at most.
Again assuming a first order system wlog, the control law u i,dc now depends its own state as well as those of robots in its coalition as designated by the the network graph g and robots' states b. The state of each robot evolves as:
15) Note that even though its control law and hence dynamics incorporate more extensive state information, parts of this information will have varying up-to-dateness.
APPLICATION: MULTI-ROBOT NAVIGATION
This section presents an application of game networks to the problem of multi-robot navigation [11, 20] . The task of all the robots is to navigate simultaneously to their a priori specified goal positions h i ∈ R 2 in a workspace with boundary ρ 0 . We use a feedback based approach that uses a modified version of artificial potential functions as presented in [8] . This Section presents the details of multi-robot system dynamics followed by the discussion of results from extensive simulations.
Multi-Robot Dynamics
The multi-robot system dynamics are defined by the gradient flow on F using an artificial potential function In coalition games, we assume a coalition level information propagation model where each robot communicates to its neighbors not only its own information, but also those it receives from its neighbors. Hence, the dynamics of each robot consider the state information from all the other robots that are member of the same coalition C c . Hence, n i = d c . As it can communicate directly only with its immediate neighbors, it receives information from another robot j ∈ C c with a delay that depends on the geodesic distance. For an immediate neighbor, it is assumed that there is no delay while for a robot with a geodesic distance of n−hops, the delay is proportional to (n − 1). Taking all this into consideration, its construction is as follows:
where k i ∈ Z + is the relative weighting parameter. The function ϕ i,ni is made admissible via composing it with σ : [0, ∞) → [0, 1] defined as by σ = x x+1 . In order to make the goal a non-degenerate critical point, further composition with a sharpening function
The function γ i,ni encodes the proximity of all robots to their respective goals in a manner that depends on the extent of neighborhood n i as:
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where b n−1 j denotes the state information with the propagation delay of n − 1 hops. If the information is accessed without any delay, the superscript argument is omitted. The denominator β i,ni encodes the distance from freespace boundary in a manner that also depends on the extent of neighborhood n i and propagation delay: 
Simulations
The simulations are done using robot teams consisting of 20 robots all having radii 25cm. The workspace radius is taken to be 15m. We consider two kinds of goals which differ with respect to the distance ρ d between two vertically or horizontally adjacent robot goal positions as shown in Fig. 1 . In exploration type (ET) tasks, the robots are required to navigate to goal positions that cover the given workspace so that ρ d is large. In our case, ρ d = 5m. As the robots should not collide during while engaged in their task, ET tasks implicitly require coordination among the robots. In procession type (PT) tasks, the robots are required to position themselves in a cortege arrangement and hence ρ d is relatively small. Here, ρ d = 1m. These type of tasks require both coordination and cooperation among the robots as the robots may be blocking each other from getting to their target locations. Each robot has transmitter power P T = 15 dBm allocated for wireless communication. The environmental noise is considered in levels varying from low and high as given by σ 2 n ∈ 5 × 10 −5 , 5 × 10 −4 . It is assumed that the communication delay δt d for each hop after the first hop is fixed and set to 0.15 seconds. Furthermore, τ = 1000, ς i = 1500 and a i = 1. We study the nature of the resulting navigation behavior and task accomplishment under pairwise and coalition game networks. The move period T g is varied from being very small (which means that the new moves are made very frequently) to being relative large (10 times more than of frequent moves). For each goal type, game and noise level, 50 simulations are performed with the robots starting at random initial positions while being fully disconnected. For an ET task in an environment having σ 2 n = 5 × 10 −5 , T g = 10, the progress of the communication network under coalition games is sampled at four instances as shown in Fig. 2 . The first graph shows the robots' initial positions and the network topology. The next two graphs show the networks at 25% and 75% of the total task time. For example, at 25% of the total task time, there are six coalitions -four coalitions consisting of only one robot, one coalition consisting of two robots and the remaining coalition consisting of 14 robots. The last graph shows the final network when the task is completed. We study two performance statistics: Task completion percentage and efficiency. The task completion percentage is the percentage of navigation tasks that have been successfully completed in finite time. Hence, failure is any case where navigation of all the robots to their target locations is not achieved. The performance in task completion is presented in Table 1 . For move period T g = 1 and σ 2 n = 5 × 10 −5 , both pairwise and coalition games have almost the same task completion percentage whereas for higher noise level, task completion of coalition game is better in PT tasks. Although increase in T g results in dramatical changes in the task completion, coalition game gives better performance than the pairwise game, regardless of the noise level and task type. Since robots within a coalition have information regarding each other, even though the information is possibly not up-to-date, still it is useful and hence the rate of task completion increases. Task completion efficiencyĒ is measured as the average of the total distance traveled by the robots normalized by the Table 2 , in pairwise games, for almost all task types,Ē is lower which means that tasks are completed with more efficiency. This can possibly be attributed to the fact that as the robots become more myopic, they take less of other robots' states and goals into consideration and hence navigate more efficiently. Although for the task completion efficiency the pairwise game has the smallest value, the task completion percentage of coalition game has higher than that of the pairwise. For the coalition game, while tasks are more likely to be completed, their efficiency is lower. 
CONCLUSION
This paper considers the bidirectional interaction between states and communication network in a multi-robot system. The network formation is proposed to be based on game-theoretic decision-making utilizing the trade-off between the gain and cost of communication. The contribution of this paper is to present two alternative games that may be played that are extremes of each other. In pairwise games which may be sufficient for tasks requiring coordination, each robot decides to establish or break off a link based on the improvement this offers to it individually. In tasks requiring both coordination and cooperation, it may be preferable to play coalition games where all the robots in each coalition decide collectively. New links are added or removed based on the improvements they offer to the respective coalition. Interestingly, while performance in both type of games are observed to be extremely sensitive to the frequency of moves, coalition games seem to be slightly less susceptible. As part of our current work, we are focusing on exploring the trade-off between performance and completion time in pairwise and coalition game networks and implementing them in a real multirobot application.
